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A presente tese investiga se as decisões dos investidores têm influência em 
investidores subsequentes, tomando isto como momentum (embalo) de 
financiamento. Esta tese apresenta uma análise do comportamento de 
investidores num contexto de Equity Crowdfunding, utilizando uma amostra de 
todos os investimentos realizados em 134 campanhas publicadas na plataforma 
Invesdor, entre 2012 e 2017. Os resultados obtidos indicam que, num ambiente 
onde o nível de assimetria de informação é substancial, os investidores 
incorporam as ações tomadas pelos outros nos seus próprios processos de 
tomada de decisão. De facto, esta tese apresenta evidências de que, ao longo de 
uma campanha, não só é possível que a dinâmica de investimento ganhe 
momentum, como o momentum ganho até determinado dia influencia 
positivamente os investimentos subsequentes. Adicionalmente, esta tese 
apresenta uma análise empírica das dinâmicas de investimento em Equity 
Crowdfunding considerando a diluição de ações que ocorre após uma campanha 
entrar em overfunding como determinante de decisões. Apesar de os 
investimentos feitos serem de pequena ordem, os resultados apontam no sentido 
de os investidores tomarem em atenção a diluição de ações associada a uma 
campanha nos seus processos de tomada de decisão. Evidencia-se um efeito 
negativo provocado no momentum de investimento, que é ainda maior quando 
apenas são consideradas campanhas bem-sucedidas. A autora discute como é 










The present thesis investigates whether investors’ decisions have an influence 
on subsequent investors, ascertaining this as funding momentum. It presents an 
analysis of the behaviour of investors in an Equity Crowdfunding setting, using 
a sample of all the investments made on 134 campaigns posted on the platform 
Invesdor, from 2012 to 2017. The results seem to indicate that, in an environment 
where the level of information asymmetries is substantial, investors look at the 
actions of others in their own decision-making. In fact, this thesis presents 
evidence that throughout the duration of a campaign not only it is possible for 
the funding dynamic to gain momentum, but also the momentum gained until a 
given day in a campaign positively influences subsequent investments. In 
addition, this thesis presents an empirical analysis of funding dynamics in Equity 
Crowdfunding taking into account the share dilution that occurs after a 
campaign enters in overfunding as a determinant of decisions. The results seem 
to indicate that, although the investments are of relatively small order, investors 
take into account the share dilution of a campaign in their decision making. The 
evidence suggests a negative effect provoked on the funding momentum, which 
is even higher when only considering successful campaigns. One discusses how 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Crowdfunding (CF), as a recent and emerging funding option for ventures in 
business investment (Mollick, 2014), is developing in innovative ways. It is a 
“broader concept of crowdsourcing”(Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 
2014, p. 586) combined with microfinance (Mitra, 2012) and striped down it 
consists of raising funds for a given project or venture by a crowd 
(Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2010) without the standard financial intermediaries 
(Mollick, 2014)1. Griffin (2012, p. 4) stated that “Crowdfunding is like posting a 
classified advertisement on a website (…), an entrepreneur advertises a business 
concept and requests funding from interested parties”.  
Crowdfunding may have become a viable option for start-ups and early-stage 
businesses to get access to the financing they need (Borello, Crescenzo, & Pichler, 
2015; Cordova, Dolci, & Gianfrate, 2015; Vulkan, Åstebro, & Sierra, 2016), in 
alternative (or in addition) to Business Angels (BA) and Venture Capitalists (VC) 
and other traditional sources of funding (Tomczak & Brem, 2013).  
Early stage businesses and start-ups struggle to attract financing for their 
ventures, because when a business is beginning its entrepreneurial lifecycle it 
presents insufficient cash flows, have a high degree of risk and uncertainty 
attached (Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009), and lack assets, giving rise to a 
funding gap (Borello et al., 2015). In addition, the traditional financing sources 
                                                 
1 This paper assumes a crowd to be a group of people whom are interested in funding projects.  
 
2 
available for the entrepreneurs of early ventures usually constrain investors to 
fund only on a local level (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2014). After the 
financial crisis that arose in 2008, VC and BA, facing an environment of 
uncertainty, started investing in a later stage in the funding cycle in an effort to 
mitigate their risk (Block & Sandner, 2009), thus further exacerbating the funding 
gap previously mentioned. 
Adding the evolution of web 2.0 technology to the credit crunch that occurred 
after the financial crisis of 2008 (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2014; 
Brabham, 2008; Kirby & Worner, 2014; Kleemann, Voß, & Rieder, 2008), the 
conditions were propense to the rise of CF. Besides being able to provide start-
ups and small companies with the access to financing that they (most likely) 
wouldn’t get otherwise, it presented two major advantages for entrepreneurs: the 
reduction in marketing and transaction costs and the possibility to get a prospect 
of the market (Belleflamme & Lambert, 2014; Valanciene & Jegeleviciute, 2013). 
Simultaneously, it allowed investors to reduce their exposure to risk since 
investments made in CF are very small compared to VC and BA setting, thus 
allowing them to more easily diversify their portfolios (Agrawal et al., 2014). 
Although CF might be a viable option to raise funding, it is also a very risky 
environment. There are five types of CF: donations, rewards, lending, equity, and 
hybrid (Irene, 2012). This study addresses the riskiest type: Equity 
Crowdfunding (ECF). This is the case because, while in other types of CF when 
one makes an investment decision it assesses the quality of a project, on ECF, on 
the other hand, one must assess the quality of a whole firm and whether it will 
be able to generate enough cash flow to compensate the investment made. This 
further increases the risk of information asymmetry since, inevitably, the 
entrepreneur will know more than the investors (Agrawal et al., 2014; Backes-
Gellner & Werner, 2007; Sigar, 2012). Hence, the concern that CF might lead 
investors to fund fraudulent or unqualified businesses exists, firstly because 
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investors do not have to be accredited nor experienced, and since the process 
occurs on the internet, it does not exist a very large window of opportunity for 
the investors that are experienced to perform due diligence (Agrawal et al., 2014; 
Griffin, 2012; Valanciene & Jegeleviciute, 2013). 
Having all this in consideration, ECF presents itself as a setting where herd 
behaviour is very likely to occur. That is, in the absence of sufficient information 
to make a decision that is fully rational, investors might look at the actions of 
others to try to infer something about ventures’ quality (Chen, Huang, Liu, & Ma, 
2017; Zhang & Liu, 2012). 
Therefore, when investing in an ECF campaign, investors face a decision with 
two opposite “forces”, and in which the difference of the both will ultimately 
determine whether an investor will choose to fund a venture or not. These two 
“forces” are the fear of choosing not to invest in a company early enough and 
then not being able to do it because the campaign reached its maximum 
investment (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017); and the opportunity cost of 
investing in a campaign that might go unfunded, as well as having the money 
held up when it could be used to be invested in other campaigns or firms (Chen 
et al., 2017; Zhang & Liu, 2012). Although these forces work on an individual 
level, in a scenario where information asymmetries are substantial, when 
investors see the actions of others they might incorporate them into their own 
beliefs (Banerjee, 1992). As Kim and Viswanathan (2016, p. 1) state, when 
studying CF in a market for mobile applications, “(…) the majority of investors 
in this market – the crowd – although inexperienced, are rather sophisticated in 
their ability to identify and exploit nuanced differences in the underlying 
expertise of the early investors”. 
The main goal of the present thesis is to understand whether investors’ 
decisions have an influence on subsequent investors, ascertaining this as funding 
momentum. One studies the role of funding momentum and if it arises from the 
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herding behaviour that one might find in ECF. One argues that in the funding 
dynamics of an ECF campaign, momentum arises when the investors perceive 
others’ decisions as signals of the underlying quality of a certain venture, and 
once a campaign gains momentum it affects the propensity of subsequent 
investments and, ultimately, a campaign’s success. 
This thesis was written in an organizational context. The curricular internship 
took place in a strategical consultant, Triple A – Capital & Finance. The 
consultant is a financial advisor with special emphasis on small and medium 
enterprises and new business opportunities, resorting to the traditional funding 
options (bank loans, angel investors, venture capital and common funds) in their 
advisory scheme. The theme chosen arose from the necessity of the company in 
having alternative funding options for smaller clients, other than the traditional 
funding channels. This way, one can introduce the consultant to a new method 
of raising funds for their clients, as well as demonstrate how to assess the quality 
of a campaign and model it in the best way possible, to achieve success. In 
addition, a study of the dynamics of investors, whether it is on a CF setting or 
not, is always feasible since, although most investors in ECF are unexperienced, 
some are also VC and BA simply investing through a different channel. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as following: Chapter 2 performs a literature 
review on equity crowdfunding and its funding dynamics, on herding behaviour 
and on dilution of shares, Chapter 3 presents the data sample, the hypotheses 
development and the construction of the model, Chapter 4 discusses the results 
obtained and, finally, Chapter 5 draws the main conclusions, identifies 







Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Equity Crowdfunding 
In Equity Crowdfunding (ECF) companies issue shares or other types of 
securities in return for capital, falling within the category of financial return 
crowdfunding (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017).  
ECF is the type of crowdfunding whose target companies are start-ups, seed-
stage companies and small and medium enterprises, being an alternative source 
of funding to these kind of companies (Deffains-Crapsky & Sudolska, 2014; 
Wilson & Testoni, 2014).  
Typically, a campaign in a ECF context can follow two models regarding the 
acceptance of pledges: the First-Come First-Served (FCFS) model, where pledges 
are accepted by the order that they are made, and the auction mechanism 
(Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017). The dynamics in investment are quite different 
from one to the other since the incentives to wait or to invest right away differ, 
as well as the information revealed from each investors’ decision to the rest of 
the crowd2. Although one acknowledges the auction mechanism as a type of ECF 
campaign, it is irrelevant to the purpose of this thesis and, therefore, will not be 
studied.  
                                                 
2 In a second-price auction, the price is different throughout the campaign since it changes with each pledge. 
On FCFS setting, on the other hand, the price remains constant (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017). Although 
this might lead one to think that on a FCFS mechanism investors have no incentive to wait, as hypothesised 
by Hornuf and Schwienbacher, this is actually not the case as one will show further ahead.  
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There are two types of crowdfunding models: the All-or-Nothing (AON) or 
Keep-it-All (KIA) (Cumming, Leboeuf, & Schwienbacher, 2015). The difference 
between the two resides in the amount of capital that can be kept by the 
entrepreneur. In crowdfunding (in general), the entrepreneur sets a minimum 
amount of capital to be raised, that is a minimum target. If this goal is not 
reached, in a AON model, the entrepreneur doesn’t receive any of the amount 
raised and all pledges are returned to the investors, whereas in a KIA model, the 
entrepreneurs receive the total amount pledged. To the best understanding of the 
author, ECF platforms can only take the form of AON campaign.  
2.1.1 Success in Equity Crowdfunding 
There are several studies conducted about the funding dynamics in 
crowdfunding contexts. There are studies analysing characteristics of 
entrepreneurs, investors and platforms, altogether and individually. However, 
only in the most recent years was this analysed in a ECF context.  
In a rewards-based CF setting, some have studied which factors have an 
impact on crowdfunding success. Cordova et al. (2015), using a sample of 1127 
technology projects on four crowdfunding platforms, found that the higher is the 
target amount set by the entrepreneur for the campaign, the less likely will the 
campaign be funded. On the other hand, their results showed that the duration 
of a campaign and the amount contributed per day both have a positive influence 
in a campaign’s likelihood of success.  
In a study conducted by Vulkan et al. (2016), the authors find that the main 
differences between ECF and rewards-based CF are the target amount of capital 
that entrepreneurs seek and the average sum pledged by investor (which are both 
higher in ECF) the requisite of a pre-money valuation, and the fact that investors 
are specially motivated to invest because of financial return.  
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In a non-equity CF platform, (rewards-based to be precise), a study was 
conducted regarding the geography of investors and the funding dynamics, 
namely by Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb (2011). They find that geographic 
distance in a CF context (in this particular case, music-related businesses) does 
not confine the source of funding to the same geographic area as the business 
being advertised. Following, the authors discuss whether CF, and in particular 
ECF, can or not mitigate distance-related frictions between investors and 
entrepreneurs. In a more recent paper, Günther, Johan, & Schweizer (2016) 
analyse the same issue in a ECF context and come to the conclusion that 
geographic distance does not lose the importance one would expect, and indeed 
impacts negatively the likelihood of investment. They compare investors that live 
overseas to investors in the geographic area of the venture being funded, 
concluding that although overseas investors do not seem to be affected by 
distance, there is strong evidence that home investors are.  
Several other papers analyse the geographic dispersion of investors and 
entrepreneurs, in order to be able to answer the question, of whether or not ECF 
can mitigate the distance related frictions that exist in VC and BA funding 
channels (Agrawal et al., 2011; Günther et al., 2016; Mollick, 2014). However, one 
will not study the geographic-related frictions found in ECF.  
There are some studies about ECF campaigns studying the likelihood of 
success of the campaigns, considering the size of the venture, the growth of the 
business and the geography of entrepreneurs and investors (Agrawal et al., 2011; 
Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2015; Mollick, 2014; Vulkan et al., 
2016). 
Studying which signals sent by start-ups induce small investors to invest in a 
certain campaign of ECF, Ahlers et al. (2015) examine financial roadmaps, 
external certifications, board structure and size, and risk factors. Based on a 
sample of 104 ECF campaigns, the authors present empirical evidence that 
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signalling plays a major role for investors, with special emphasis on potential risk 
factors, equity percentage offered, and the board’s structure and size. Their 
results also highlighted the fact that crowdfunding and its market operate in a 
relatively rational way, even among unsophisticated investors.  
Vismara (2016) investigates the role of signalling towards external investors, 
regarding equity retention and social capital. The author presents evidence that 
campaigns in which the equity retained by the entrepreneur was higher and in 
which the amount of social capital was greater, had higher likelihood of success.  
In another paper, Vismara (2015) contributes to literature by studying the 
signalling dynamics between investors in a campaign, researching how 
information cascades affect the probability of success. The author studies the 
importance of the first days of a campaign in attracting subsequent investors thus 
contributing to the campaign’s success. The fact that a higher number of pledges 
in the early days of a campaign contributes to the probability of success was 
demonstrated in other contexts but one will not address this literature.  
2.1.2 Funding Dynamics in Equity Crowdfunding 
Literature about funding dynamics in CF is somewhat extensive, although it 
is more focused on non-financial CF.  
Agrawal et al. (2014) found evidence that accumulated capital increases an 
investor’s propensity to fund a campaign, raising the possibility to lead to 
herding behaviour and report that this can work the other way around, that is, 
when new investors see a campaign accumulating capital too quickly it can lead 
to a “bystander effect” (p. 66), wherein investors believe the campaign will be 
funded either way and therefore will not invest (Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2018).  
Regarding early contributions in an ECF context, using a sample of 111 ECF 
campaigns, Vismara (2015) shows that investors that make pledges in the early 
days of a campaign have a positive influence on subsequent investors, perceiving 
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early contributions as a signal that a certain campaign will achieve the target 
funding amount. 
Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) investigate the dynamics of equity 
crowdfunding using information from four different equity crowdfunding 
platforms in Germany, finding that in a FCFS model the dynamics of investment 
are L-shaped throughout a campaign. Additionally, they present evidence that 
updates and comments on the campaigns had a strong positive influence in 
subsequent investments. This result was also obtained by Block, Hornuf, & 
Moritz (2018), whom analysed updates and comments on 71 pitches on two 
German ECF platforms and reached estimation results indicating that updates 
had an effect on the number of investments of a campaign, as well as the amount 
raised, although this impact was not immediate (not as linear as the number of 
updates on day t affecting the number of investments on day t+1)3. Moreover, it 
was speculated that the crowd perceived larger investments as a signal of the 
quality of the ventures. This was also discussed by Vulkan et al. (2016) and 
Hornuf & Schwienbacher (2017) whom, as stated before, investigated which 
factors were associated with driving success in an ECF campaign, finding that 
the existence of high pledges in campaigns contributes positively to the 
campaign’s probability of success.  
Vulkan et al. (2016) reached the same conclusion as Vismara (2015), that the 
number of investors in a campaign, and their social networks, contribute to 
subsequent investments and to the success of the campaign.  
Studying the possibility that investors in ECF might engage in herding 
behaviour, Chen et al. (2017) present evidence of rational herding. Their results 
show that accumulated capital, up until the previous period considered, has a 
positive influence in subsequent investments (in line with the previously 
                                                 
3 Cordova et al., (2015) in a rewards-based setting of CF also studied the impact of updates on the likelihood 
of success finding, however, no relation between the former and the latter.  
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mentioned studies). More specifically, the authors show that previous 
accumulated capital contribute to the funding propensity of the next day, where 
the number of investments in a day have an inverted U-shape relationship with 
accumulated funding. Hence, at a certain time of a campaign the number of 
investors starts to negatively influence subsequent investments. Other 
conclusion is that as a campaign is reaching its target funding goal, it becomes 
more interesting to investors than when it was in the beginning. This also has to 
do with the time value of money, that is, in the beginning of a campaign if an 
investor makes a pledge the money just sits in an escrow account waiting for the 
campaign to reach the target amount, whereas when the campaign is close to 
reaching the target the likelihood of being successful is higher. They also 
presented evidence that high pledges induce less investments as they are 
perceived as a signal of a major event of share dilution. They also find that the 
amount of equity offered doesn’t impact the amount raised per day which is 
somewhat disconcerting since other literature presented previously found 
evidence that it affects the probability of success. The major drawback of this 
study is the sample used, which encompasses 92 equity crowdfunding 
campaigns that only allow for accredited investors.  
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2.2 Herding Behaviour 
Over the years there were presented several definitions for the concept of 
herding behaviour. Devenow & Welch (1996) performed a systematic review of 
herding behaviour in the context of financial markets, referring that herding 
behaviour arises when agents’ decisions to invest are correlated to one another. 
Others state that herding behaviour is the act of incorporating the public opinions 
and actions of others into their own beliefs (Cote & Sanders, 1997). 
However, the expectation of agents behaving in a similar manner, for itself, is 
not a sufficient condition to determine if there exits herding behaviour since this 
might happen by coincidence or because of a specific context where agents get 
access to the same information (Lobão, 2012).  
Banerjee (1992) draws in a straightforward model of herd behaviour where 
agents decide sequentially, cannot choose to delay their decision and can only 
see the other agents’ actions (not the information they have nor the signals they 
got). He suggests that when players try to infer information from others’ actions, 
the agents automatically become less responsive to their own private 
information, which makes their subsequent decisions no longer a source of 
potential information to others. The author refers to this as a “herd externality” 
(p. 799). He states (p. 809) “(…) the choices made by agents are not always 
sufficient statistics for the information they have. If the choices are always 
sufficient statistics, future agents always know what information their 
predecessors had acted upon, and therefore there is no herd externality and no 
inefficiency. It is when the choices made by some agents affect the information 
that subsequent decision makers have that there is a potential for herd 
externality”. An implication of the model designed by the author is that the order 
of choice is determined exogenously, that is, one cannot choose to delay his 
 
12 
decision. This is unrealistic in a financial setting (and even more on an CF 
context) since waiting is, in fact, an option and it has an opportunity cost 
associated. When the cost is high, herding happens almost the same way as in a 
no-waiting context; however, when this cost is relatively low, the herd behaves 
in a different manner.  
On a different note, Choi (1997) studies herding behaviour in a technology 
adoption process considering a backwards perspective, that is, the author 
investigates how first movers make the decision to invest, knowing that the 
adoption of a certain technology will reveal information to others. On other 
words, they tried to assess how late adopters impact the decision of first movers 
rather than how first movers influence subsequent adopters. The author states 
(p. 2) “(…) every agent has to predict the informational consequences of her 
actions on those of the subsequent decision-makers which, in turn, affect her own 
payoff”. This statement is true when one is not in the presence of a setting where 
there is complete information available. The fact that herd behaviour might 
occur, bias the decision of the first mover towards safer options instead of the 
best technologies. Therefore, in the model described by the author, what is taken 
into consideration is how the revelation of information inherent to the decision 
of the first mover actually prevents him from adopting the technology. As so, in 
a setting where there is a waiting option, they describe a “penguin effect” (p. 19): 
“(…) each user will be reluctant to move first as long as there is a possibility that 
her choice may turn out to be so inferior as to make orphan her adoption”, 
implying that all agents will have the incentive to wait for others to move first, 
due to the learning mechanism that it triggers.  
Bikhchandani & Sharma (2000) perform a systematic literature review on the 
models presented over the years to detect herd behaviour in financial markets. 
They point out the main causes for herd behaviour as the existence of imperfect 
information (asymmetries), concerns for reputation and compensation 
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structures. They argue that once a cascade starts, and therefore herding occurs, 
after the first few decision-makers the decisions of subsequent investors add 
nothing to the pool of knowledge and make individuals invest regardless of their 
own private information (which is in accordance with the model developed by 
Banerjee (1992)). Another important conclusion of this study is that a cascade can 
be ended just as easily as it started, simply by the arrival of new information, 
which induces agents to adjust their beliefs.  
Graham (2003) empirically tests herd behaviour using data regarding 
investment newsletters. His findings are that the tendency to herd increases with 
some aspects: the reputation of analysts, their abilities, the consistency of public 
information related to private information, and with the correlation of signals 
among the analysts.  
Chen et al. (2017) distinguish rational herding from irrational, stating that the 
former occurs when potential investors assimilate previous pledges as a sign of 
reliable information and adapt it to their expectations, while irrational herding 
happens when potential backers simply follow others’ investments without 
assessing themselves the venture’s quality. Also, herding intensifies in situations 
in which information asymmetry is higher (when the technology risk of the 
company is high, for example) (Zhang and Liu, 2012). 
As previously mentioned, ECF is an environment characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty due to information asymmetries and because most 
businesses are in an early stage of their development. The risk associated with 
the investment is high, and, quoting Chen et al. (2017, p. 6) “investment decisions 
of others are perceived as a positive signal of unobservable quality of the project”, 
thus inducing investors to behave in a herding manner (Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Vismara, 2015).
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2.3 Share Dilution 
Literature about share dilution in corporate finance is quite extensive and 
diversified. For that reason, one will not approach it in all its extent, but only the 
literature that can be applied directly to CF.  
Firstly, as previously mentioned in the Introduction chapter of this study, ECF 
is much more comparable to an early-stage VC and BA setting than to other types 
of crowdfunding. Vulkan et al. (2016) enumerate the main similarities found 
between BA and early-stage VC and ECF as being the amount of funding 
requested in the campaigns, the existence of a business plan, an explicit pre-
money valuation and an equity share arrangement for each pledge made. Having 
this said, one may argue that when investors in ECF are in the process of decision-
making, they will value the company and their investment much like early-stage 
VC and BA value start-ups and early-stage ventures. Therefore, in this section, 
one develops the theoretical framework on the venture capital method of valuing 
start-ups and early-stage companies.  
When one is talking about early-stage businesses and start-ups the lack of 
history of the performance of the company and the fact that the entrepreneur 
will, unavoidably, know more about the business than the VC (information 
asymmetry, which is even higher in a CF setting) (Backes-Gellner & Werner, 
2007; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), makes the process of valuing the 
company more complicated and almost ambiguous (Anshuman, Martin, & 
Titman, 2012). That is exacerbated by the fact that the valuation will be performed 
based on projections provided by the entrepreneurs and, most of the times, will 
tend to be biased upwards. Hence, investors will make their decisions based on 
their valuations, and also on the setting that surrounds them which, in the case 
of early stage ventures, is characterized by high volatility (Sahlman, 1988). 
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As previously mentioned, the main difference between ECF and other types 
of crowdfunding is that in ECF an investor is not valuing solely a project, but an 
entire firm.  
VCs will access the total value of the company to decide whether to invest or 
not, especially when valuing early-stage ventures (Johnson, 1998). Inevitably, 
each investor will have its own valuation of a company (or at least perceive it 
from others’ actions, in the specific case of CF).  
To understand the venture capital method of valuing a firm, consider the 
following example in which there is a firm with the following pre-money 
valuation and is seeking the following investment:  
•  Pre-money valuation: 10,000€ 
•  Investment required: 3,000€ 
•  Post-money valuation: 13,000€ 
•  Equity equivalent to the investment: 3,000/13,000 = 23.08% 
Now, consider the specific case of crowdfunding, where there is a minimum 
and maximum target amount of investment to be raised. Firstly, note that a 
minimum and maximum target amount also imply a minimum and maximum 
post-money valuation. Taking the previous example as what would happen in 
the case of the minimum investment, now consider the case of the maximum 
investment: 
•  Pre-money valuation: 10,000€ 
•  Maximum investment: 5,000€ 
•  Post-money valuation: 15,000€ 
•  Equity: 5,000€/15,000€= 33.33% 
Considering that there are only two investors, in which the first one gives the 
minimum investment, 3,000€, and the other investor gives the remaining 2,000€, 
what would, previously, represent 23.08% acquisition of a company, now 
represents 3,000/15,000 = 20%. With this example it becomes quite clear to 
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understand how dilution of shares will work on an ECF setting, for the investors. 
Until the minimum target amount is reached every investment represents the 
same ownership of the company (proportionally to the investment). After the 
minimum target amount is achieved, every investment made implies issuance of 
new shares, which involves the calculation presented before and hence, the share 
dilution of the investors that made pledges before the campaign achieved its 
minimum. 
As Johnson (1998, p.3) states “The investment decision for the venture 
capitalist and the negotiation with the entrepreneur centre on: (i) the perceived 
value of the company before the financing (the pre-financing valuation) and (ii) 
the amount of money that the company is raising”. 
When an entrepreneur defines the investment goal for his company he faces a 
two-determinant decision: setting the target amount of capital to be raised at its 
minimum, in order to retain the maximum equity possible, or setting it a higher 
level, in the case the company will need more than firstly perceived (Sahlman, 
1988). As Sahlman (1988, p. 31) states, the entrepreneur will set the company’s 
target amount of investment balancing “(…) the fear of running out of capital 
and the desire to retain maximum possible ownership (…)”.  
In the case of ECF, an entrepreneur can do both, setting a minimum target 
amount, which will ultimately correspond to the company’s most absolute needs, 
and a maximum target amount, which will correspond to the maximum level of 
investment that the company will need in case something goes wrong. 
If the entrepreneur sets the minimum target too low and the maximum target 
too high, one argues that the early investors will consider the share dilution they 
might eventually face, before making their decision.  
Therefore, when one develops the empirical model to test for funding 
momentum, in Chapter 4, one considers the share dilution as determinant of the 






Chapter 3  
Data and Method 
3.1 Platform Description 
The data used to estimate our model, was kindly shared by the platform 
Invesdor, for most part, and hand-collected for the variables for which 
information was not provided.  
Invesdor is a Finnish ECF platform with headquarters in Helsinki and was the 
first equity-based crowdfunding platform to be founded in Northern Europe. 
The platform was founded in 2012.  
Most campaigns in the platform are equity based, but Invesdor also accepts 
rounds for issuance of bonds and Initial Public Offerings (IPO).  
Until the present moment, Invesdor was able to raise more than 48 million 
Euros, having had 201 pitches (including equity, bonds, and IPO) going public 
until the 30th of October of 2017, of which 101 were successful, corresponding to 
a success rate of approximately 50.25%. 
On the webpage of the platform one has access to the pitches of the campaigns, 
both for successful and unsuccessful campaigns4, although after a campaign has 
ended the companies may choose to delete their pitch webpage5. On each pitch 
webpage one has access to: the story of the company, a description of the business 
                                                 
4 http://www.invesdor.com/en/pitches . 
5 This happens mostly with unsuccessful campaigns although some of the successful pitches also had their 
webpage eliminated.  
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and current market situation, the team, the purpose of the funds, the valuation 
of the company, an assessment of risks, information on issue terms, financial 
forecasts and the documents uploaded by the company. This is not true for all 
campaigns since when the platform was launched the information requested was 
not so demanding and, also, the information shared on the website varies from 
campaign to campaign. Companies may also choose to attach a video to the pitch. 
Regarding the campaign, one can see the company name, the investment range 
(minimum and maximum amount sought), the equity offered (minimum and 
maximum equity), the price per share and minimum securities required per 
pledge, the number of existing shares, pre-money valuation, estimated revenue 
in the cruising year, the start date of the campaign, the location of the venture, 
the field of the business and its development stage and, finally, how much was 
raised until the considered moment, how many investments were made, and on 
what days. However, investors do not have access to how much each other 
investor has pledged nor whether or not it is a legal entity or a natural investor; 
one can only see a nickname which does not necessarily have to be a real name 
and, on top of that, investors may even choose to not display the nickname at all, 
investing anonymously.  
An important note about this platform is that the pitches are first uploaded in 
a hidden mode, that is, only a few selected investors are able to see the pitch and 
only when the pitch obtains 30% of funding, does the webpage go public.  
3.2 Data Sample 
The main goal of the present study is to understand whether investors 
decisions have an influence on subsequent investors ascertaining this as funding 
momentum. In other words, one wants to verify the impact of day to day 
interactions throughout an ECF campaign’s duration. 
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In order to do this, one analyses a sample encompassing all the investments 
made in the Finnish platform Invesdor on 134 campaigns, from the 16th of May 
of 2012 to the 31st of August of 2017. This sample was kindly provided by the 
platform. The raw data included 201 campaigns. There were eliminated 6 
campaigns, which were not equity crowdfunding (bonds and IPO), other 35 
campaigns were eliminated in which there was funding from external sources to 
which we did not have access to the date or nature of the investment, another 6 
campaigns were dropped on which we did not have information on all the 
investments made in that campaign, 3 campaigns were dropped because they 
had less than 2 weeks of duration and another 17 campaigns were dropped 
because we did not have access to the webpage of the pitch and therefore the 
information not provided by the platform could not be collected. The final data 
is comprised of 134 campaigns, where the shortest campaign has 13 days and the 
longest campaign has 233 days, encompassing a sample of 11245 observations of 
a panel dataset, with campaign and day as dimensions.  
3.3 Hypotheses development 
The literature review performed in the previous Chapter lead one to develop 
and test the hypotheses elaborated in the present section.  
Firstly, one intends to investigate if campaigns gain momentum in their 
funding dynamics and if this relationship is constant throughout a campaign or 
follows an inverted U-shape relationship, as evidenced by Chen et al. (2017). 
Hypothesis 1a: The number of investments made on a given day of a campaign have 
an impact on the propensity to invest in the following day.  
Hypothesis 1b: The relation hypothesised between the number of investments on a 




Secondly, to evaluate if the crowd behaves in a herding manner when the 
funding of a campaign gains momentum, one develops the following 
hypotheses, in line with previous studies (Agrawal et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2017). 
Hypothesis 2a: The cumulative investments made on a campaign up until a given 
day have an impact on the propensity to invest in the following day.  
Hypothesis 2b: The total amount raised in a campaign up until a given day have an 
impact on the propensity to invest in the following day.  
Hypothesis 2c: The average pledge made by investor inferred on a given day of a 
campaign have an impact on the propensity to invest in the following day.  
Hypothesis 2d: The percentage left unfunded on a given day of a campaign have an 
impact on the propensity to invest in the following day. 
In line with the hypotheses elaborated to test for herding behaviour, one 
would like to explore the impact of new information on the propensity of funding 
and on momentum, according to previous literature ( Block et al., 2018; Cordova 
et al., 2015; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017). 
Hypothesis 3: The arrival of new information, in the form of updates, on a given day 
of a campaign have an impact on the propensity of funding in the following day.  
Finally, to investigate the impact of share dilution on the propensity of 
funding one tests the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The ownership an investor gets for pledging the minimum investment 
required, on a given day of a campaign, have an impact on the following day.  
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3.4 Variables  
3.4.1 Dependent Variable  
The variable one will try to explain in this model will be the number of 
Investments pledged in a certain day of a campaign. To do so, one defines the 
variable Number of Investments per day, (Nr_Invesmentsit) as the number of 
investments made on campaign i on day t.  
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
The variables used to explain the model are:  
•  Lag Number of Investments, (Nr_inv_dayit-1), which corresponds to the 
number of investments made on campaign i until day t-1. This variable 
will also be integrated with a quadratic term (Nr_inv_day2 it-1) to restrict 
the assumption that the relation between this variable and the 
explained variable is linear, and to test the results achieved by Chen et 
al. (2017) that this same relationship follows an inverted U-shape 
pattern 6 . This variable and its quadratic termwill be used to test 
hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
•  Lag of the cumulative investments, (Cum_investmentsit-1), which 
corresponds to the total number of investments made on campaign i 
until day t-1, following previous studies (Agrawal et al., 2014; Chen et 
al., 2017). This variable will be used to test hypothesis 2a.  
•  Lag of the Cumulative Amount, (Cum_amountit-1), which corresponds 
to the total amount of funding raised on campaign i until day t-1. This 
variable will be used to test hypothesis 2b. 
                                                 
6 Although Chen et al. (2017) studied this relationship with the dependent variable being “amount raised in 
day t” instead of “number of investments on day t”. 
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•  Lag of the Average pledge, (Average_pledgeit-1), which corresponds to 
the total amount raised divided by the total number of investors of 
campaign i on day t-1. Previous studies investigated the impact of a 
large pledge in subsequent investments (Block et al., 2018; Chen et al., 
2017; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017; Vulkan et al., 2016). However, in 
this specific platform, investors cannot observe how much each 
investor has pledged. The crowd can only see on which days 
investments were made, how many pledges were made and how much 
was raised until the moment. Therefore, we use this variable to try to 
understand how the perception of the crowd of the average pledge 
affects the investment decisions, instead of using a variable of the 
largest pledge. This regressor will be used to test hypothesis 2c. 
•  Lag of the Updates, (Nr_updatesit-1), following previous studies that 
used Updates as a variable to measure the impact of new information 
(Block et al., 2018; Cordova et al., 2015; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017), 
one uses the variable updates per day, with a lag, which corresponds to 
the number of updates posted by the entrepreneur of campaign i on day 
t-1. This variable will be used to test hypothesis 3.  
•  Lag of the Ownership from Minimum Investment, 
(Ownership_from_minit-1), which is a variable to control for share 
dilution. It measures the percentage of ownership that the minimum 
investment on campaign i represents until day t-1 (this variable only 
changes once the campaign goes into overfunding). It is calculated as 
the lag of  	 
 		
( 	   	 	)
, when the 
campaign has not reached the minimum target; and as the lag of 
 	 
 		
( 	 	  )
, when a campaign enters in 
overfunding. The Minimum amount of Investment is calculated as the 
product of the price per share and the minimum amount of securities 
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required per share. Moreover, this variable suffered a natural 
logarithmic transformation to control for its skewness. This variable is 
used to test hypothesis 4.  
•  Lag of Percentage left unfunded, (Till_targetit-1), in line with Chen et al. 
(2017) one defines this variable as the percentage of the minimum target 
of campaign i that is left unfunded until day t-1. This variable takes the 
value 0 once a campaign enters in overfunding. This variable will be 
used to test hypothesis 2d.  
 
The control variables are presented below. Note that all these variables are 
time-invariant. 
•  Minimum Target, (Minimum_targeti) in line with previous studies, we 
control for the minimum amount sought by the entrepreneur of 
campaign i (Ahlers, et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017; Vismara, 2015). 
•  Minimum Equity Offered, (Minimum_equityi) following previous 
studies, we control for the minimum equity offered in campaign i 
(Ahlers, et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017; Vismara, 2015). 
•  Financial Forecasts, (Financialsi) following Ahlers et al. (2015) we use a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 in case there were presented 
financial forecasts in the pitch webpage of campaign i, and 0 otherwise. 
•  Stage – Seed and Early, (Stage_earlyi and Stage_seedi) to control for the 
development stage of the venture, we introduce two dummy variables, 
Stage_Seedi that takes the value 1 in case the venture of campaign i is in 
the seed stage and 0 otherwise; and Stage_Earlyi, that takes the value 1 
in case the venture of campaign i is in the early stage and 0 otherwise. 
There is a third stage, which is growth; however, if one were to 
introduce this variable in the model it would cause multicollinearity 
issues (since one regresses all models with a constant). 
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3.5 Model Specification 
The estimation equation that will regress the explained variable on the 
explanatory and control variables, will make use of the panel dataset in Section 
3.2. 
The distribution of the explained variable is very skewed to the right. Of the 
11245 observations in the final dataset, 8878 observations are zeros. Therefore, 
the use of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression would yield biased results 
and the estimation of the coefficients would not be appropriate. Following, one 
chose to estimate the equation that will be presented below with the count model 
for panel datasets fixed-effects negative binomial regression, with exposure to 
the number of days of each campaign.  
The estimation equation is defined as follows: 
!"_$%&_'()	 =  +, + +.!"_$%&_'()	.  + +/012_$%&34523%54	.  
+ +6012_(271%5	. + +89&3"(:3_;<3':3	.  
+ +=!"_1;'(534	.  +  +>ln (AB%3"4ℎ$;D"722$%)	.  
+  +EF$<<5(":35	.  + +GMinimumLMNOPL
 +  +QMinimumPRSTLU
 
+  +.,V$%(%W$(<4  +  +..StagePMN]U
 +  +./Stage^PP_ +  ℇ	  
 
Since the model used is a fixed-effects regression model, all the variables that 
are time invariant must be dropped from the equation. Thus, the first equation 
to be estimated will be:  
!"_$%&_'()	 =  +, + +.!"_$%&_'()	.  + +/012_$%&34523%54	.  
+ +6012_(271%5	. + +89&3"(:3_;<3':3	.  
+ +=!"_1;'(534	.  +  +>ln (AB%3"4ℎ$;D"722$%)	.  
+  +EF$<<5(":35	. + &	 
(1) 
In order to control for specific characteristics of the campaigns, interaction 
terms between the cumulative amount of investment and each of the time-
invariant variables is added to the model, following Chen et al. (2017). 
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Computing the correlation matrix of all the explanatory variables, one did not 
find correlation issues between the variables. However, following Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher (2017) we drop the variable Financialsi, taking as true the 
following statement “in principle the disclosure of the business plan should not 
affect the dynamics of the funding process later on” (p. 10). The correlation 
matrix can be found in the Appendix section. 
The final equation is then defined as follows:  
!"_$%&_'()	 =  +, + +.!"_$%&_'()	.  +  +/012_$%&34523%54	.  
+ +6012_(271%5	. + +89&3"(:3_;<3':3	.  
+ +=!"_1;'(534	.  +  +>ln (AB%3"4ℎ$;D"722$%)	.  
+ +EF$<<5(":35	.  + +G012_(271%5	. ∗ Minimum_target  
+ +Q012_(271%5	. ∗ Minimum_equity        
+ +.,012_(271%5	. ∗ Stage_early                  
+ +./012_(271%5	. ∗ Stage_Seed  +  1	   
(2) 
One will estimate equation 1. Equation 2 will be estimated with 3 
specifications: the full model, the full model with campaigns that received at least 
30% of funding (to encompass only campaigns in which the pitch was made 










Discussion of Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the full sample.  
 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Nr_inv_dayit-1 0.90538 0 5.51520 0 221 
Nr_inv_day2 it-1 31.23442 0 658.1518 0 48841 
Cum_investmentsit-1 26.75162 6 82.50415 0 1248 
Cum_amountit-1 48856.77 6720 131661.2 0 1268100 
Average_pledgeit-1 2137.825 774.8276 5583.23 0 362700 
Nr_updatesit-1 0.01574 0 0.14616 0 6 
Till_targetit-1 0.76584 0.92 0.30485 0 1 
ln(Ownership_from_minit-1) -8.78349 -8.61250 1.38844 -13.8643 -5.17048 
Minimum_targeti 151373.5 80010 162207.4 20000 893521.1 
Minimum_equityi 0.10199 0.06849 0.11362 0.00408 0.75 
Financialsi  0.84135 1 0.36536 0 1 
Stage_seedi 0.75286 0 0.43136 0 1 
Stage_earlyi 0.11916 1 0.32340 0 1 
Table 1 - Summary Statistics. 
Note: The statistics presented are computed across 11245 observations.  
Interpreting summary statistics for a panel dataset can be somewhat 
challenging given that, in this specific sample, the dimension of time is not 
constant across campaigns. Considering the data presented in Table 1, one can 
infer that in the day corresponding to the middle of each campaign, the median 
number of investments made in the previous day is 0, the median Cumulative 
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investments made until the day before is 6, the median cumulative amount raised 
until the day before is 6,720 euros, the average pledge inferred from the 
investments made until the day before is 774.83 euros (approximately), the 
number of updates is 0, the median percentage left unfunded is 92%, and the 
median ownership one gets from the minimum investment in the previous day 
is 0.018%7. As for the time-invariant variables, the median minimum target is 
80,010 euros, the median minimum equity offered is 6.85% (approximately), the 
median campaign presents financials and is on an early stage of its development.  
Table 2 and Table 3 present summary statistics for the same variables, 
distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful campaigns.  
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Nr_inv_dayit-1 2.20376 0 8.80861 0 221 
Nr_inv_day2 it-1 82.42962 0 1073.982 0 48841 
Cum_investmentsit-1 60.91679 23 126.9745 0 1248 
Cum_amountit-1 105160.5 36341.18 196929.9 0 1268100 
Average_pledgeit-1 2609.143 1459.194 6892.973 0 362700 
Nr_updatesit-1 0.02021 0 0.17261 0 6 
Till_targetit-1 0.50151 0.57373 0.34009 0 1 
ln(Ownership_from_minit-1) -8.86781 -8.82556 1.05496 -11.07478 -6.33977 
Minimum_targeti 153843.3 80000 165603.3 20000 750000 
Minimum_equityi 0.07882 0.05555 0.08458 0.00408 0.47059 
Financialsi  0.87328 1 0.33270 0 1 
Stage_seedi 0.54327 1 0.49818 0 1 
Stage_earlyi 0.21469 0 0.41066 0 1 
Table 2 - Summary Statistics for Successful Campaigns. 
Note: The statistics presented are computed across 4206 observations 
  
                                                 
7 Since we performed the natural logarithmic transformation of the variable Ownership_from_minit-1, the 
results reported in the summary statistics are computed as following example: for a mean of 
ln(Ownership_from_minit-1) the mean of Ownership_from_minit-1 is given by exp(a). 
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Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Nr_inv_dayit-1 0.12956 0 0.79192 0 39 
Nr_inv_day2 it-1 0.64384 0 19.49803 0 1521 
Cum_investmentsit-1 6.33698 3 11.30162 0 143 
Cum_amountit-1 15213.74 1484 38688.81 0 601620 
Average_pledgeit-1 1856.199 483 4604.537 0 62820.99 
Nr_updatesit-1 0.01307 0 0.12771 0 4 
Till_targetit-1 0.92379 0.97992 0.11255 0 1 
ln(Ownership_from_minit-1) -8.73310 -8.54189 1.55180 -13.86430 -5.17048 
Minimum_targeti 149897.7 100000 160137.6 20000 893521.1 
Minimum_equityi 0.11584 0.07407 0.12585 0.016401 0.75 
Financialsi  0.82228 1 0.38231 0 1 
Stage_seedi 0.87811 1 0.24132 0 1 
Stage_earlyi 0.06208 0 0.32718 0 1 
Table 3 - Summary Statistics for Unsuccessful Campaigns. 
Note: The statistics presented are computed across 7039 observations. 
 
Both in the case of successful and unsuccessful campaigns, in the middle day 
of a campaign, the median number of investments made in the previous day is 0, 
the median number of updates made in the campaigns’ webpage in the previous 
day is also 0. Furthermore, the median firm presents financials and it is in the 
seed stage of its development. 
The remaining variables differ quite a lot from successful to unsuccessful 
campaigns. In the median day, the median firm of an unsuccessful campaign 
only presented 3 investments and raised 1,484 euros, corresponding to an 
average pledge of 483 euros in the previous day, whereas the median firm of a 
successful campaign presented 23 investments and had raised 36,341.18 euros, 
corresponding to an average pledge of 1,459.19 euros, in the previous day. The 
median firm presented, in the median day, a percentage left unfunded of 97.99% 
and a minimum investment corresponding to an ownership of 0.02%, in the case 
of unsuccessful campaigns, and 57.37% and 0.015%, respectively, in the case of 
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successful campaigns. As for time-invariant variables, the minimum amount 
sought by the median firm is 100,000 euros, corresponding to a minimum equity 
of 7.41%, in the case of unsuccessful campaigns, whereas the median successful 
campaign sought a minimum amount of 80,000 euros, and offered 5.55% of 
minimum equity.  
These statistics allow us to give a preliminary answer on which variables will 
most likely affect the funding momentum of a campaign. One expects the 
number of investments made in a certain day of a campaign to positively 
influence the number of investments made the next day, although one expects 
this relationship to follow an inverted U-shape (Chen et al., 2017): from a certain 
point on, investments made up until that point start to negatively influence 
subsequent investments. The cumulative investments made, the cumulative 
amount raised, and the average pledge are expected to positively influence 
subsequent investments, taken from the difference in values from successful to 
unsuccessful campaigns. The same impact is expected when there are updates in 
the previous day of a campaign. As for the percentage left to reach the target 
amount, in line with the expectation from the cumulative investments and 
amount, it is expected to negatively influence subsequent investments: the higher 
is the percentage left for the campaign to be successful the lower will be the 
propensity of subsequent investments. Regarding the percentage of ownership 
to which the minimum investment, throughout a campaign, correspond, it is 
difficult to make an inference from the summary statistics presented, although, 
based on the literature review performed, one expects this variable to negatively 
influence subsequent investments. 
As for time-invariant variables, from the differences in statistics from 
successful and unsuccessful campaigns, one expects that the higher the target 
amount and equity offering are established, the lower will be the impact of 
previous investors on the following ones.  
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4.2. Empirical Analysis and Results 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the regression analysis.  
Variables Model (1) Full Model 
(2) 
Full Model  
>30% SR 


































































































     Number of Observations 10187a) 10187a) 6156 3857 
Log-likelihood -7611.4568 -7587.6677 -6532.3161 -5463.2917 
Number of Pitches 123 123 80 53 
Table 4 - Estimation Results (Average Marginal Effects). 
Note: All specifications include a constant term. Standard-errors in parenthesis. *** denote p-values < 0.01, 
** denote p-values < 0.05, * denote p-values < 0.10. 




In the table presented above the results of the regression model estimations 
are presented. Note that the negative binomial regression model models the 
logarithm of the expected count of the dependent variable, expressed as a 
function of the explanatory variables. Therefore, one should interpret the 
coefficients presented as follows: when the considered independent variable 
changes by one unit, the logs of the expected counts of the explained variable are 
expected to differ by the coefficient of the given independent variable.  
In line with Chen et al. (2017), one’s results present evidence that the 
investment decisions visible in a campaign on a certain day, indeed have an 
impact on subsequent investment decisions. The lag of the number of 
investments taken as a predictor of the number of investments yields a 
statistically significant estimator, at a 1% level of significance, in all four model 
specifications, suggesting an inverted U-shape relationship between the number 
of investments made on day t-1 and the number of investments made on day t. 
This inverted U-shape relationship is inferred from the negative signal of the 
estimate of the quadratic term of the referred explained variable (as simple as it 
can be exposed: y= x – x2). Therefore, one finds evidence that confirm hypotheses 
1a and 1b, finding that funding momentum arises throughout a campaign and 
has a positive influence on subsequent investments, although the relationship is 
not linear. 
Following, and in line with previous studies (Agrawal et al., 2014; Chen et al., 
2017), one finds that the total number of investments made up until day t-1, have 
a positive impact in the difference in the logs of the expected number of 
investments on day t, yielding statistically significant estimates for the four 
model specifications, at a 1% significance level. This result comes in support of 
the hypothesis 2a, suggesting that the crowd behaves in a herding manner taking 
into account how many investments were already made before making the 
decision to invest.  
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Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, one finds that when considering the three 
specifications of the full model, the two variables previously discussed yield 
lower coefficients in the case where we only consider successful campaigns. Only 
considering successful campaigns, one would expect the opposite effect, that is 
that the herding behaviour would be more, rather than less, prevalent in 
predicting the outcome of the explained variable and would have a higher impact 
on funding momentum. In other words, one would expect herding behaviour to 
be less intensive in unsuccessful campaigns which would yield a lower estimate 
for the coefficient when considering the full sample. On the other hand, one 
cannot infer this from the models specified since the comparison is not between 
unsuccessful and successful campaigns. What is being considered is the “power” 
of the estimates in predicting the outcome of the explained variable in successful 
campaigns comparing to the full sample. One could only infer this by the 
summary statistics presented in the previous section.  
As for the cumulative amount raised until day t-1, one finds that this predictor 
is statistically significant to the model, impacting positively the difference in the 
logs of the expected number of investments on day t. The estimator yields 
statistically significant estimates of the explained variable, at a 1% significance 
level, for model specification (1). When we introduce the interaction terms with 
time-invariant covariates, the estimates yielded by this regressor are statistically 
significant but only at a 5% level. This was partially expected because the 
interaction terms are defined as the product of the time-invariant covariates with 
the cumulative amount of investment, which inevitably raises correlation 
between this variable and those same variables. The results one obtained for this 
regressor support hypothesis 2b, suggesting that there exists herding behaviour 
among investors, whom take in consideration how much was raised until the 
considered moment.  
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One finds no relation between the average pledge on day t-1 and the number 
of investments on day t. Since in the case of platform Invesdor one cannot see 
how much each investor has pledged, using the average pledge as a way to 
control for large investments was not a viable method. This might be because 
investors associate large pledges with specialized investors, an assumption that 
they cannot infer from an average pledge unless they monitor the campaign 
every single day, which is, most likely, not the case. Therefore, one finds no 
empirical support of hypothesis 2c.  
The estimator of the percentage left unfunded on day t-1, has a statistically 
negative impact (at a 1% significance level) on the propensity of investments on 
day t. This estimate confirms the result obtained by Chen et al. (2017): when a 
campaign is closer to reaching its funding goal, the propensity to invest increases 
and when it is far it decreases. This comes in support of hypothesis 2d, 
highlighting that investors behave in a herding manner having few incentives to 
invest when the campaign has not gained momentum.  
As one would expect from the results and conclusions of other studies (Block 
et al., 2018; Cordova et al., 2015; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017), the number of 
updates to a pitch yields a positive, statistically significant estimate (at a 1% level 
of significance) of the difference in the logs of the expected number of 
investments on day t, on campaign i. One would expect this result since the 
number of updates posted in a pitch’s webpage can serve as a proxy for the 
availability of new information. This can be perceived specifically, and when the 
update is relevant enough, as the reduction in information asymmetry, which 
corroborates hypothesis 3.  
One defined the variable ownership from minimum investment which is an 
estimator that controls for the share dilution that occurs when a campaign goes 
into overfunding. As expected, when the ownership investors get from the 
minimum investment on day t-1 decreases, so does the log of the expected 
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number of investments on day t. These results yield that investors, in fact, take 
into consideration the dilution of shares that occurs once a campaign enters in 
overfunding before they make the decision to invest. This verifies hypothesis 4: 
indeed, like in early-stage VC and BA, investors consider the share dilution they 
might suffer. This affects negatively the funding momentum and the propensity 
to invest. Furthermore, the effect of this variable is even more accentuated when 
only considering successful campaigns, which further confirms hypothesis 4. 
Although investments might be of small order, results yield that ownership is an 
important determinant of investments decisions and a possible disrupter of 
funding momentum. 
Now analysing the time-invariant control variables, firstly, one can infer that 
the minimum amount sought by a firm negatively influences investment 
decisions. One reason for this is that the higher the funding target, the more 
investors will have to invest and the more difficult it will be to raise the funds 
necessary. Therefore, setting a reasonable funding goal is an important decision 
that might affect how the funding dynamics of the campaign will happen. As for 
the minimum equity offered, we only find a statistically significant estimate in 
the specification model with only successful campaigns.  
Finally, the stage of the company seems to have an influence if the company is 












Conclusions and future work 
Given the importance that CF has gained in the past few years, and with 
special emphasis on ECF, one felt the need to answer the question of how 
investors behave in this context. In an environment characterized by a high 
degree of risk and information asymmetry, it is important to understand how 
investors make their decisions and whether they incorporate the actions of others 
into their own beliefs. To a limited extent, one can predict the outcome of a 
campaign by analysing the momentum it gains throughout the duration of the 
campaign.  
The data supports the hypothesis that funding momentum increases the 
propensity of investment in a positive way, although this relationship is not 
linear. In addition, results point to the fact that funding momentum ultimately 
leads to herding behaviour and is an important determinant of investors’ 
decisions.  
The findings presented by this study show that investors, indeed, behave in a 
herding manner, looking at how others make their decisions. The evidences show 
that when there are a lot of pledges made in a certain campaign in a single day, 
pledges in the next day are bound to occur, controlling for campaigns observable 
characteristics. In addition, to the best knowledge of the author, this is the first-
ever empirical study to take into consideration the share dilution that is bound 
to happen after a campaign enters in overfunding. Findings suggest that not only 
do investors consider the share dilution that may occur in overfunding into 
account, but also it affects the dynamics of investment in a negative way. 
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Although investments might be of small order, results yield that ownership is an 
important determinant of investments decisions and a possible disrupter of 
funding momentum. 
There are a few limitations to this study. Firstly, the sample only encompasses 
134 campaigns which might be higher than most studies performed, but it is still 
a very small number to make predictions consistent enough.  
Secondly, one studied campaigns that raised money solely through the 
platform. Although the main goal of this thesis was to analyse investment 
dynamics in a “pure” CF setting, the existence of campaigns in which external 
investments were made raised the question of how these investments affect the 
agents making pledges through the platform. One did not take into account these 
campaigns because information on external investments was not available (the 
total amount raised externally was available, but the amount raised externally 
per day was not). This would make certain variables (such as, the cumulative 
amount raised, for example) impossible to calculate since information about all 
the investments on those campaigns was incomplete.  
As for suggestions for future research, one highlights that it would be 
interesting to perform an analysis on campaigns occurring at the same time and 
on whether investors made the decision to invest in a campaign in detriment of 
another. This was actually performed before (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2017), 
but in a comparison between FCFS campaigns and auctions.  
One further identifies that it would be relevant to try to establish the 
equilibrium point between the two opposing “forces” mentioned in the 
introduction section. That is, one could investigate what is the equilibrium point 
in a campaign in which the force of the opportunity cost of making a pledge on 
an unsuccessful campaign and the force of the fear of “being left-out”, annul each 
other. This would also identify the point in which an investor would be 
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